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Using a model with constant relative risk-aversion preferences, endogenous labor supply and partial
insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, we provide an analytical characterization of three welfare
effects: (a) the welfare effect of a rise in wage dispersion, (b) the welfare gain from completing markets,
and (c) the welfare effect from eliminating risk. Our analysis reveals an important trade-off for these
welfare calculations. On the one hand, higher wage uncertainty increases the cost associated with missing
insurance markets. On the other hand, greater wage dispersion presents  opportunities to raise aggregate
productivity by concentrating market work among more productive workers. Our welfare effects can
be expressed in terms of the underlying parameters defining preferences and wage risk, or alternatively
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Cross-sectional wage dispersion and individual wage volatility over the life-cycle are large.
For example, the variance of the growth rate of individual wages in the United States in the
cross-section is over 100 times larger than the variance of the growth rate of average wages
over time.1 Moreover, there has been a sharp increase in wage dispersion in the United
States over the past thirty years.2 An important task for macroeconomists is to study the
welfare consequences of this phenomenon.
In this paper, we develop a tractable class of dynamic heterogeneous-agent economies
with partial insurance against idiosyncratic labor productivity (wage) risk and with endoge-
nous labor supply. The process for idiosyncratic wages has two orthogonal components: an
uninsurable piece, and a component that may be fully insured. This modelling strategy
for market incompleteness allows us to solve for the equilibrium allocations in closed form,
which in turn leads to a transparent welfare analysis.
Several authors have examined the welfare consequences of changes in earnings or income
risk.3 We focus instead on wage risk and endogenize labor supply because the ability to adjust
hours can mitigate the welfare cost of rising wage inequality via two alternative channels.
First, agents may vary hours worked inversely with ﬂuctuations in individual wages, thereby
reducing ﬂuctuations in earnings. Alternatively, agents may choose to work more hours in
periods when individual wages are high, thereby increasing average earnings per hour. A
negative wage-hour correlation is more likely to be observed if agents cannot smooth income
by other means, such as by purchasing explicit insurance against wage risk. Conversely
the wage-hour correlation will be positive if wage inequality can be insured directly within
ﬁnancial markets. Thus the model highlights an interesting interaction between the asset
market structure and the role of endogenous labor supply in absorbing idiosyncratic wage
shocks.4
1This number is calculated from the PSID, 1967-1996. The variance of the mean wage growth over the
period is 0.0012 and the cross-sectional variance of individual wage growth, averaged over the period, is
0.161. See Section 7 for details on the sample selection.
2For surveys on the causes of the changes in inequality, see Katz and Autor (1999), Acemoglu (2002),
Aghion (2002), and Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005).
3See e.g. Attanasio and Davis (1996); Blundell and Preston (1998); Krueger and Perri (2006); and Krebs,
Krishna and Maloney (2005).
4Low (2005) explores the implications of this interaction for the life-cycle proﬁles of consumption, hours
and asset holdings.
1We consider two standard classes of time-additive preferences with constant relative risk
aversion; one in which agents have CRRA preferences over a Cobb-Douglas composite of
consumption and leisure, and one in which preferences are additively separable between
consumption and hours worked. For each preference speciﬁcation we derive intuitive ana-
lytic solutions for equilibrium allocations and expected lifetime utility as functions only of
preference parameters and of the variances of the insurable and uninsurable components
in individual labor productivity. These transparent expressions enable us to answer three
distinct questions related to welfare and inequality.5
First, what are the welfare costs of rising wage dispersion, holding constant the asset
market structure? Second, what are the welfare costs of market incompleteness, deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between expected lifetime utility in the baseline incomplete-markets economy
versus a complete-markets economy, holding constant the wage-generating process? Third,
what are the welfare eﬀects from eliminating individual wage risk? This last welfare calcu-
lation is the cross-sectional equivalent of the calculation underlying the vast literature on
the welfare costs of business cycles ﬂuctuations (for a survey, see Lucas, 2003). Note that
these three inquiries reﬂect changes in diﬀerent primitives of the model: technology in the
ﬁrst (e.g., skill-biased technical change), markets in the second (e.g., the emergence of new
ﬁnancial instruments), and policies in the third (e.g., redistributive taxation schemes that
align ex-post wages across all workers).
When labor supply is ﬂexible, increased wage inequality impacts not only consumption
inequality, but also leisure inequality and the average values for consumption and leisure.
More precisely, welfare eﬀects are driven by two oﬀsetting forces: an increase in idiosyncratic
wage risk increases the need for insurance, but also presents opportunities to increase the level
of aggregate productivity, measured as output per hour worked, by concentrating work eﬀort
among more productive workers. To clarify the trade-oﬀ between risk and opportunities, we
decompose the overall welfare eﬀects into the relative contributions of changes in aggregate
consumption and leisure on the one hand, and changes in the cross-sectional dispersion of
these variables on the other (see also Benabou, 2002; and Flod´ en, 2001).
A related point is that there is an important diﬀerence between insuring risk and elimi-
5It should be clariﬁed that we study inequality in individual labor productivities within a competitive
labor market. Thus we do not analyze “frictional inequality” - pure wage dispersion arising between ex ante
identical workers because of search frictions (e.g., Mortensen, 2003).
2nating risk when labor supply is ﬂexible. In fact, eliminating risk will always lead to smaller
welfare gains than insuring risk, because removing risk also takes away opportunities to
increase average labor productivity.
The ﬁrst set of analytical welfare expressions we report incorporate structural model
parameters deﬁning preferences and the insurability of wage risk. A key result of the paper
is that welfare eﬀects can alternatively be expressed as simple functions of various moments
of the cross-sectional joint distribution over wages, hours and consumption. For example,
in the separable-preferences case, the welfare eﬀect associated with a change in the wage
process can be expressed as the sum of the changes in (i) the covariance between log-wages
and log-hours, (ii) the variance of log-consumption weighted by the coeﬃcient of relative
risk-aversion, and (iii) the variance of log-hours weighted by the inverse of the labor supply
elasticity.
This representation of welfare eﬀects has two advantages relative to our ﬁrst structural-
model-based set of welfare expressions. First, it is more general, since it does not depend
on the particular market structure assumed. In particular, the expression applies to any
economy in which the standard intratemporal consumption-leisure ﬁrst order condition con-
dition is satisﬁed, and in which equilibrium allocations and wages are jointly log-normally
distributed. The second advantage is that we do not have to take a stand on the fraction
of wage risk that is insurable. Thus we can estimate welfare eﬀects simply by computing
the relevant moments in repeated cross-sections and assigning values to preference parame-
ters. However, a drawback with the cross–sectional-moment-based representation is that it
requires high-quality data on consumption and hours, while the ﬁrst approach only requires
panel data on wages. We therefore view the two alternative approaches as complementary.
In the rest of the paper, we refer to the ﬁrst set of welfare expressions as “model-based” and
to the second as “observables-based”.
In the quantitative part of the paper we compute the answers to our three welfare ques-
tions by calibrating the model to the U.S. economy. With Cobb-Douglas preferences and a
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equal to two, the welfare cost of the rise in labor market
risk in the U.S. over the past 30 years in the incomplete-markets economy is 2.5% of lifetime
consumption. This number is the combination of a welfare loss of 7.5% due to larger unin-
surable ﬂuctuations in individual consumption and hours, and a welfare gain of 5% from an
increase in aggregate labor productivity.
3For the same preferences, households would be willing, ex-ante, to give up almost 40%
of their expected lifetime consumption in exchange for access to complete markets. One
might suspect that this welfare gain stems from reducing inequality in the cross-sectional
distributions for consumption and leisure. Instead, we ﬁnd that two thirds of the welfare
gains from completing markets take the form of higher average productivity. Thus our
analysis highlights an important cost of missing markets that has been largely overlooked
to date, namely the loss in aggregate labor productivity that arises when low productivity
agents work too much (because lack of insurance makes them ineﬃciently poor) while high
productivity agents work too little (because lack of insurance makes them ineﬃciently rich).
Finally, we ﬁnd that eliminating all individual wage risk through distortionary taxation
delivers a welfare gain which is only about half the size of the gain from completing markets,
but at least two orders of magnitude larger than Lucas’ estimates of the potential welfare
gains from stabilizing business cycles (0.008-0.1 percent of average consumption).
The main contribution of our paper is to clarify what drives the welfare eﬀects of changes
in the wage process, emphasizing the role of labor supply. In addition, our simple framework
can also shed light on the quantitative ﬁndings of richer incomplete-markets models with more
complex interaction between wages and the wealth distribution. In particular, when properly
calibrated, our model delivers quantitatively similar results to Krueger and Perri (2003), and
Pijoan-Mas (2005). The advantage of our approach is that welfare eﬀects can be solved for in
closed form (rather than via numerical solution and simulation), and consequently the roles
of preference parameters, wage risk parameters and market structure are all transparent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model economies,
and Section 3 deﬁnes our three welfare measures. Sections 4 and 5 characterize equilibrium
allocations and the analytical model-based welfare expressions that obtain under the two al-
ternative preference speciﬁcations we consider. Section 6 derives the alternative observables-
based welfare representation. Section 7 describes the calibration to the U.S., and reports
our quantitative results. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The Economy
Demographics and preferences: The economy is populated by a unit mass of inﬁnitely-
lived agents. Each agent has the same time-separable utility function over streams of con-
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where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the agents’ discount factor. We will consider two alternative speciﬁcations
for the period utility function. In the ﬁrst, consumption and leisure (1¡ht) enter in a Cobb-
Douglas fashion. In the second, period utility is separable between consumption and hours
worked.
Production and individual labor productivity: The aggregate production function
exhibits constant returns to scale with labor as the only input. Output cannot be stored. The
labor market and the goods market are perfectly competitive, so individual wages equal in-
dividual productivity. Since we do not focus on growth or aggregate short-term ﬂuctuations,
we normalize the hourly rental rate per eﬃciency unit of labor to unity.
Individuals’ wage rates vary stochastically over time, and are independently and iden-
tically distributed across the agents in the economy. We assume that an individual’s log
wage at a point in time has two orthogonal components: a ﬁxed eﬀect ® 2 A µ R, and a
transitory iid shock "t 2 E µ R:
logwt = ® + "t: (1)
The ﬁxed eﬀect ® is drawn in an initial period prior to the start of period 0: Then for every
t ¸ 0; each agent draws a value for "t.6 Let Φv denote the Normal cumulative distribution
function with mean ¡v
2 and variance v. Then, "t » Φv" and ® » Φv®: As a result, logw » Φv,
where v = v" + v®, which implies that the population mean wage (in levels) is equal to one.
The fact that the mean wage is invariant to dispersion will turn out to be convenient when
we study comparative statics with respect to the variances v" and v®.
Market structure: Households have access to perfect insurance against the transitory
"-shocks and no insurance against the permanent ®-shocks. Since ® is not insured, the
equilibrium of this economy will only oﬀer partial insurance. The extent to which insurance
6These assumptions on the statistical representation of the shocks are made mainly for ease of exposition.
In Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2007b) we demonstrate that the analysis can be extended to allow
for a richer speciﬁcation of the wage process, while still retaining analytical tractability. The process for
® (the uninsurable component) can incorporate permanent shocks, and the process for " (the insurable
component) can virtually follow any ARIMA process.
5is incomplete depends on the size of v® relative to v": We deﬁne competitive equilibria
sequentially: all assets traded are one-period-ahead Arrow securities in zero net supply.







0 = bt¡1 + wtht t ¸ 0; (2)
where bt¡1 is the realized gross return on assets purchased in t ¡ 1, and pt("
0) and bt ("0)
are functions deﬁning respectively the price and quantity purchased of securities that pay
one unit of output in period t + 1 contingent on the realization of "t+1: An arbitrarily loose
constraint on borrowing rules out Ponzi schemes.
In period t = ¡1; the timing is as follows. First ® is drawn. Then ﬁnancial markets open
oﬀering state-contingent claims conditional on the realization of "0: Agents are born with






0 = 0 t = ¡1:
Discussion: Our model imposes exogenously a speciﬁc market structure leading to
partial insurance. In this respect, it belongs to the set of models in which markets are
exogenously incomplete, a set which also includes “Bewley models” in which asset trade is
limited to a non-contingent bond. Our approach to modelling partial insurance is designed to
capture, in a tractable way, the fact that actual economies allow some degree of risk sharing
through a variety of channels, but not perfect risk-sharing.7 We partition risks into two
categories: the ﬁrst set of risks are assumed transitory in nature and fully insurable, while
the second are permanent and fully uninsurable. There are at least two ways to motivate
these assumptions.
First, one natural interpretation of our framework is as an approximation to models in the
Bewley (1986) tradition in which a single risk-free asset is traded. Even though these models
do not have explicit insurance markets, allocations in the two environments are very similar
7Cochrane (1991) ﬁnds evidence of full insurance against short-lived transitory income shocks (e.g. short
spell of illness, absence from work due to strikes). Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1992) argue that some
income shocks are fully absorbed within the family. Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) show that a
sizeable fraction of ﬁrm-level productivity shocks are insured by the ﬁrm and do not transmit to workers.
Livshits et al. (2006) demonstrate that bankruptcy laws act as eﬀective insurance against some states with
low income realizations.
6because borrowing and saving through a risk-free asset allows for near-perfect smoothing of
transitory shocks, but provides no insurance against permanent productivity diﬀerences.8
However, while Bewley models require numerical solution, equilibrium allocations in our
economies can be characterized analytically, as shown below. In Section 7 we revisit the
comparison between these two models.
Second, one could interpret the model literally as capturing that there exists explicit in-
surance against some risks (such as short spells of unemployment or illness) but not against
others (such as being endowed with low ability or being born to poor or uneducated par-
ents). In environments where market incompleteness emerges endogenously as a result of
informational or enforcement frictions, it is typically relatively easy to provide insurance
against transitory risks, and relatively hard to provide insurance against permanent risks.
This suggests a further rationale for our assumed mapping between the persistence of shocks
and their insurability.9
Solving for the equilibrium: It is instructive to sketch our approach for ﬁnding the
competitive equilibrium allocations (see Appendix A for full details). We start by guessing
that because the distributions for ® and " are independent, agents can perfectly diversify
shocks to " by trading Arrow securities only with other agents sharing their particular
realization for ®. In other words, we guess that the economy is equivalent to a world in
which agents are distributed across segregated “®¡islands”, where each island is a closed
economy with complete insurance against the " shocks. We can then solve for allocations at
the island level using a static planner’s problem with equal weights (equal since all members
of an island share the same uninsurable component ® and have zero initial ﬁnancial wealth).
The planner chooses how to allocate labor eﬀort and consumption among all agents on
the island, subject to a resource constraint that equates aggregate island consumption to
aggregate island production. Given these allocations, we compute the implied prices of Arrow
securities in the corresponding within-island competitive equilibria, and verify that these
prices do not depend on ®. This conﬁrms the initial guess of no trade between ®¡islands.10
8See Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997) for discussions on the role of precautionary saving in smoothing
income shocks which are not too persistent.
9See, for example, Huggett and Parra (2006) and Krueger and Perri (2006) for discussions of the link
between persistence of shocks and ability to provide insurance in economies with, respectively, private infor-
mation and limited commitment frictions.
10In Heathcote et al. (2007b) we show that this approach for solving for the equilibrium allocations remains
valid even when agents face permanent stochastic innovations to ®.
7A very convenient property of equilibrium allocations that follows intuitively from the
solution method is that the pair (®;") constitutes a suﬃcient statistic for equilibrium indi-
vidual consumption, hours worked, and start of period asset holdings. It is not necessary
to include individual ﬁnancial wealth as a separate state variable when characterizing con-
sumption and hours worked because the distribution of individual wealth naturally does not
appear in the planner’s problem that is used to solve for within-island allocations. This
feature of the economy simpliﬁes the solution considerably, since instead of keeping track
of the endogenous evolution of individual wealth, we need only worry about the exogenous
evolution of individual labor productivity. By contrast, in the typical Bewley model, no
shocks can be perfectly insured, and the welfare theorems do not apply. Thus the compet-
itive equilibrium must be tackled directly, which means including individual wealth as an
endogenous state variable.
We denote the time-invariant functions deﬁning equilibrium individual wages, consump-
tion, hours and start-of-period asset holdings w(®;"); c(®;"); h(®;") and b(®;") respectively.
3 Three welfare questions
We compare and rank allocations using the following utilitarian social welfare function:










This expression for welfare has two interpretations. First, it is the value for a utilitarian
planner who weights all agents equally. Second, it is the expected lifetime utility for an agent
at time t = 0 “under the veil of ignorance”, i.e., before uncertainty is realized.
We assess the welfare costs associated with labor market uncertainty from three related
perspectives. First, given the insurance market structure, what is the welfare eﬀect of a
rise in labor market risk? Second, for a given level of risk, what are the welfare gains from
completing markets? Third, what is the welfare gain from eliminating all labor market risk?
Welfare eﬀect from rising labor market risk: Suppose the variances of permanent
and transitory shocks rise from v® and v" to b v® and b v", respectively. Let ∆v® = b v® ¡v® and
∆v" = b v"¡v". Let ! denote the associated welfare gain, expressed in units of the “equivalent










u(b c(®;");b h(®;"))dΦb v"(")dΦb v®(®):
(4)
where b c(®;") and b h(®;") denote equilibrium choices in the economy with b v® and b v".
A theme of our paper is that increases in wage dispersion can impact aggregate pro-
ductivity (by changing the covariance between hours worked and individual productivity)
in addition to aﬀecting the amount of risk that agents face. We are therefore interested
in decomposing the overall welfare eﬀect ! into two pieces – a level eﬀect and a volatility
eﬀect. The level eﬀect captures the welfare eﬀect associated with changes in the size of the
aggregate pie. The volatility eﬀect captures the welfare eﬀect associated with changes in
how evenly the pie is distributed.
Formally, our strategy for identifying these two components closely follows that outlined
by Flod´ en (2001), who in turn builds on earlier work by Benabou (2002). Let capital letters
denote population averages. We deﬁne the level eﬀect associated with an increase in wage







= u(b C; b H): (5)
Next, for an agent behind the veil of ignorance, deﬁne the cost of uncertainty (in terms
of consumption) as the value for p that solves






Note that the cost of uncertainty is a measure of the utility diﬀerence between drawing a
lottery over c(®;") and h(®;") versus receiving the expected values for consumption and
leisure associated with this lottery. Analogously, we can deﬁne the cost of uncertainty
associated with the higher variances b v® and b v"; which we denote b p:
We then deﬁne the volatility eﬀect !vol of an increase in wage dispersion as
(1 + !
vol)(1 ¡ p) = 1 ¡ b p: (7)
Thus the volatility eﬀect is the percentage change in the cost of uncertainty associated with
the increase in wage dispersion.
9For both types of preferences, we will establish that the two components approximately
sum to the total welfare eﬀect, i.e., ! ' !lev + !vol:
Welfare gains from completing markets: We measure the welfare gain associated
with completing insurance markets, for given levels of permanent and transitory risk v® and
v", as the percentage increase in consumption in the partial-insurance economy required to
achieve the same welfare as in the economy with complete markets. In particular, we deﬁne










u(c(0;® + ");h(0;® + "))dΦv"(")dΦv®(®);
(8)
where the expression on the right-hand side reﬂects welfare when markets are complete and
ﬂuctuations in both ® and " are insurable.
Completing markets amounts to reducing the variance of uninsurable risk, and simulta-
neously increasing the variance of insurable risk by the same amount v®. Thus the welfare
eﬀect can be read directly from the expression for ! in (4) by setting ˆ v" = v"+v® and ˆ v® = 0.
Welfare eﬀect of eliminating risk: In computing the welfare cost of business cycles,
Lucas (1987) compared welfare associated with the actual U.S. time series for aggregate con-
sumption to welfare associated with the trend for the actual path.11 Thus he calculated the
hypothetical welfare gain from eliminating aggregate ﬂuctuations. We calculate the welfare
gains from eliminating idiosyncratic risk by making the same actual to trend comparison as
Lucas, but at the individual rather than the aggregate level. Thus we set every individual’s
wage at every date equal to its unconditional expected value.
For Lucas, eliminating aggregate ﬂuctuations was a hypothetical thought experiment.
One could view our experiment in a similar light, but in the context of our model this outcome
can in fact be achieved via an appropriate policy of full wage compression. In particular,
wage risk can be eliminated by a system of distortionary wage taxes and subsidies that
guarantees each worker an after-tax hourly wage rate equal to average labor productivity,
which in turn equals one. Thus, the tax (subsidy) rate paid by a worker with current pre-tax
11More recently, Storesletten et. al. (2001), Krusell and Smith (1999), and Krebs (2003) have made similar
calculations in models with heterogeneous agents. See Lucas (2003) for a critical survey.
10wage w is given by ¿(w) = 1 ¡ 1=w:12
In the context of our model, eliminating wage risk amounts to reducing to zero the
variances of both components of the wage process. Thus the welfare calculation can be read
directly from the expression for ! in (4) by setting ˆ v" = 0 and ˆ v® = 0.
Finally, note that the solutions for !;Â and · represent welfare comparisons across two
steady states characterized by diﬀerent variances for wages. However, this does not imply
that our welfare expressions ignore transitional dynamics. Rather the transition to a new
steady state in response to a change in the wage process is immediate in our environment.13
4 Cobb-Douglas preferences
First, we consider preferences that are Cobb-Douglas between consumption and leisure, i.e.,
u(c;h) =
¡




where ´ 2 (0;1) determines the relative taste for consumption versus leisure. Cobb-Douglas
preferences are widely used in the macro literature, since they are consistent with balanced
growth, irrespective of the choice for µ: In labor economics, this speciﬁcation is often ad-
vocated because there is some empirical evidence of non-separability between consumption
and leisure (Heckman, 1974; Browning and Meghir, 1991).
The parameter ´ is generally pinned down by the share of disposable time agents devote
to market work, implying that the single parameter µ governs both the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution for consumption and the corresponding elasticity for hours worked. In
particular, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is given by 1=µ:
12To verify that this system of wage taxes and subsidies is feasible we need to check that it is revenue
neutral. Since every agent faces the same after-tax wage, each agent works the same number of hours per
period and enjoys the same level of consumption. Per-capita consumption will equal per-capita after-tax
income, which in turn is equal to (constant) hours times the after-tax wage, which is equal to one given
the tax function ¿(w). Since average labor productivity is also equal to one, output per-capita will equal
consumption per-capita. It follows immediately that the tax-subsidy scheme is revenue-neutral.
13More precisely, the transition due to an unforeseen one-oﬀ change in the variances of either or both
components of the wage process is immediate in the sense that our expected welfare measure (3) takes
the same value in the period the wage process changes as in all subsequent periods. The key assumption
underlying this result is that assets are in zero net supply.
11The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is
¯ ° ´ ° (µ;´) ´ ¡
cucc
uc
= 1 ¡ ´ + ´µ: (9)
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply depends on hours worked, and is given by Á(µ;´;h) =
¸(1 ¡ h)=h; where ¸ ´ (1 ¡ ´ + ´µ)=µ deﬁnes the Frisch elasticity for leisure.14 It is useful to
deﬁne a “non-stochastic Frisch” elasticity of labor supply corresponding to a non-stochastic
version of the model, in which case h = H = ´, where H denotes average hours worked:










4.1 Equilibrium allocations with Cobb-Douglas preferences
The equilibrium consumption and leisure allocations in our partial-insurance economy are:








The insurable transitory shock " reduces leisure proportionately to the Frisch elasticity
for leisure ¸. Moreover, leisure is independent of the permanent uninsurable component ®
since the income and substitution eﬀects associated with an uninsurable change in the wage
exactly oﬀset with Cobb-Douglas utility.
Because ® has no impact on hours worked, consumption is directly proportional to ®.
Given non-separability between consumption and leisure, current consumption depends on
the insurable shock " as long as ¸ 6= 1. For ¸ < 1 (which is equivalent to µ > 1), con-
sumption and leisure are substitutes, in the sense that the marginal utility of consumption
is decreasing in leisure. In this case, in order to equate the marginal utility of consumption
inter-temporally, individuals who draw a high value for " and who therefore enjoy relatively
little leisure must be compensated with relatively high consumption. When µ = 1 (in which
case u(c;h) = ´ logc + (1 ¡ ´)log(1 ¡ h)), consumption is constant and equal to ´ exp(®).
Note that individual consumption and leisure also depend on the variance of the insurable
component of the log wage, v": For ¸ 2 (0;1); both consumption and leisure are increasing
14The Frisch elasticity of labor supply (leisure) measures the elasticity of hours worked (leisure) to changes
in wages, keeping the marginal utility of consumption constant.
12in insurable wage dispersion. We will return to this point when examining the welfare eﬀects
of a rise in wage dispersion.
Appendix A contains the derivations of the above expressions for c(®;") and h(®;"):
We also show that the cost of an individual’s portfolio of Arrow securities is zero. Hence the
budget constraint (2) implies that for each possible realization "0, the payoﬀ from the cor-
responding Arrow security can alternatively and intuitively be expressed as the equilibrium
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0):
Note that the dynamics of individual asset income inherit the process for the insurable
component of wages, which is iid over time.
4.2 Welfare analysis with Cobb-Douglas preferences
We collect the answers to our three welfare questions in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: With Cobb-Douglas preferences the (approximate) welfare eﬀect from a
change in labor market risk (∆v";∆v®) is:
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Proof: See Appendix B.
Corollary 1: Let Â(v®) denote the (approximate) welfare gain from completing markets
in an economy with uninsurable risk variance equal to v®: Let ·(v®;v") denote the (approxi-
mate) welfare gain from eliminating risk in an economy with variances (v®;v"): Then:












In the Proof of Proposition 1 we derive the exact closed-form solutions for the wel-
fare eﬀects. However, these expressions are cumbersome and not particularly transparent.
Through a set of log-approximations of the class ln(1 + x) ' x and ex ' 1 + x, one obtains
13the simple and useful solutions stated in Proposition 1. The linearity of the welfare eﬀects
in ∆v® and ∆v" is a feature of the approximation. In Section 7.2 we document the quality
of our approximations.
Welfare eﬀect from rising labor market risk (!): The ﬁrst term in the expression
for ! captures the welfare loss associated with a rise in the dispersion of the uninsurable
component of wages. This loss is equal to the expression computed by Lucas (1987) for
the welfare costs of aggregate consumption ﬂuctuations in an economy with inelastic labor
supply. In particular, the welfare loss is proportional to the risk aversion parameter ¯ °.
The second term signals that increasing insurable productivity dispersion increases wel-
fare in proportion to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ¯ Á. The intuition is that given
ﬂexible labor supply, an unconstrained planner can achieve better allocative eﬃciency with
larger productivity dispersion, without any loss in terms of consumption smoothing, by
commanding longer hours from high-productivity workers and higher leisure from less pro-
ductive workers. This result is closely related to the one from classical consumer theory
stating that the indirect utility function of a static consumer is quasi-convex in prices, so a
mean-preserving spread of the price distribution raises welfare (see, for example, Mas Colell
et al., 1995, page 59). The complementarity between hours and productivity in production
– a very natural assumption – is central in obtaining this result.
In the decomposition of welfare eﬀects into level and volatility components, the level
eﬀect, !lev; captures the welfare gain associated with the increase in aggregate labor produc-
tivity. Why is there a negative volatility eﬀect related to ∆v"; notwithstanding full insurance
against this source of risk? The reason is that to exploit greater dispersion in productivity
across workers, the planner must increase dispersion in hours. Since utility is concave in
leisure, this is welfare reducing. At the margin, the welfare gain for the planner from addi-
tional specialization in terms of increased average labor productivity is exactly oﬀset by the
loss associated with greater dispersion in leisure.
There is no level eﬀect associated to a change in uninsurable wage dispersion because
with Cobb-Douglas preferences labor supply is insensitive to uninsurable wage diﬀerentials
(income and substitution eﬀects exactly oﬀset). The overall welfare impact from additional
uninsurable dispersion (i.e., Lucas’ expression) is thus equal to the negative volatility eﬀect.
Figure 1 provides a picture of how our welfare eﬀects vary as we change µ; the parameter
14deﬁning agents’ willingness to substitute inter-temporally (we hold constant ´; the parameter
deﬁning consumption’s share in utility). In panel (A) we plot ! for diﬀerent values for the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity, ¯ Á
¡1; which is increasing in µ:15 Raising the Frisch elasticity
(reducing ¯ Á
¡1) reduces the welfare cost of higher dispersion. If labor supply is suﬃciently
elastic, rising dispersion is actually welfare-improving. In part this ﬁnding reﬂects the fact
that the productivity gain associated with larger insurable risk is increasing in the Frisch
elasticity, as discussed above. A second eﬀect, working in the same direction, is that with
the Cobb-Douglas utility function a higher Frisch elasticity means a lower coeﬃcient of risk
aversion (see panel (C)), which in turn implies a lower cost of rising uninsurable risk .
Welfare gain of completing markets (Â): Recall that completing markets means
(i) a reduction ∆v® = ¡v® in the variance of uninsurable risk and (ii) a corresponding
increase ∆v" = v® in the variance of insurable risk. The ﬁrst term in the expression for
Â – proportional to the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion ¯ ° – captures the value of the
additional insurance provided by increased risk-sharing. The second term captures the gains
from specialization, whereby more productive households work relatively harder and less
productive households enjoy more leisure.
Panel (B) of Figure 1 shows how the welfare gain from completing markets varies with
the elasticity of labor supply. Interestingly, the welfare gain is non-monotone. Initially, as
the Frisch elasticity falls (1=¯ Á rises), the welfare gain gets smaller, since it becomes harder
to reallocate hours in favor of more productive workers. However, as ¯ Á is reduced, ¯ ° rises
(panel (C)), and eventually a point is reached where the value of additional insurance to
shelter consumption ﬂuctuations comes to dominate the welfare calculus
Welfare eﬀect from eliminating risk (·): In a model with exogenous labor supply,
there would be no diﬀerence between insuring and eliminating idiosyncratic labor income
risk. Both changes would lead to income and consumption being equalized across individuals,
with no changes in aggregate quantities. With endogenous labor supply, however, increasing
risk-sharing is not the same thing as reducing risk at the source. The reason is that additional
insurable risk is welfare-improving with a labor supply choice, as discussed above.
15The values for (v®;v") and (∆v®;∆v") used to produce the plots are from the calibration described
in Section 6:1: Plotting welfare eﬀects against ¯ Á
¡1 rather than against µ facilitates comparison with the
separable preferences speciﬁcation. We cannot consider very low values for ¯ Á in the context of the Cobb-
Douglas utility speciﬁcation, since lim
µ!1
¯ Á(µ;´) = 1 ¡ ´:
15Comparing · with Â, it is clear that the welfare gains from eliminating risk are always
smaller than those from insuring risk. Eliminating the uninsured part of wage dispersion
is welfare-improving, since this reduces consumption dispersion. However, eliminating dis-
persion in the insurable component of wages is detrimental, since it eliminates the positive
covariance between the insurable component of individual productivity and individual hours
that boosts aggregate labor productivity. The cost associated with eliminating insurable
dispersion is increasing in the Frisch elasticity, which explains why the gap between Â and
· is decreasing in ¯ Á
¡1 in panel (B) of Figure 1.
Our ﬁnding that there is a down-side to reducing risk in the presence of ﬂexible labor
supply is mirrored in some work on the welfare costs of business cycles. Cho and Cooley
(2001) noted that if aggregate hours are pro-cyclical, then eliminating aggregate business
cycle risk may reduce average labor productivity. Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (2001)
provide an example where aggregate ﬂuctuations may be welfare improving in an equilibrium
search model when the agent can choose to allocate time between work and search.
Finally, throughout the analysis, we have emphasized that there are beneﬁts and costs
to wage inequality. A natural question then arises: Is there an optimal level of inequality?
Other authors have addressed this question formally within models where there is a trade-oﬀ
between inequality and growth (Cordoba and Verdier, 2007) or where inequality has beneﬁts
associated to incentive provision (Phelan, 2006). In our framework, the answer depends on
whether dispersion is insurable. If it is, inequality is unambiguously good, otherwise it is
unambiguously bad.
5 Separable preferences
Separability is a common assumption in the micro literature on consumption and labor








where °; ¾ 2 [0;+1). The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is simply °; while the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is 1=°. The Frisch elasticity for labor
supply is simply 1=¾. In contrast to Cobb-Douglas preferences, separability allows for a
16lot of ﬂexibility in distinguishing between agents’ willingness to substitute consumption and
hours intertemporally.
Without loss of generality, in what follows we normalize Ã, the parameter measuring the
distaste for work relative to the taste for consumption, to one. It is easy to verify that such
a normalization has no impact on the welfare expressions. An important implication of this
result is that, even if we were to allow for heterogeneity with respect to Ã, our ﬁnal welfare
expressions would remain unchanged. Thus our analysis is robust to an important class of
preference heterogeneity.
The derivations for equilibrium allocations with separable preferences are described in
Appendix C.
5.1 Equilibrium allocations with separable preferences
When preferences are separable between consumption and hours worked, equilibrium allo-


































The response of hours to permanent shocks is governed by the Marshallian (uncompen-
sated) elasticity of labor supply (1 ¡ °)=(° + ¾): Whether hours increase or decrease with ®
depends on the relative strength of substitution versus income eﬀects. With separable pref-
erences, the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect if the risk aversion parameter
° is larger than one. The Frisch elasticity 1=¾ determines the responsiveness of individual
hours to insurable shocks to individual wages.
Individual consumption is independent of the realization of the transitory shock ", re-
ﬂecting full insurance against this component of the wage process coupled with preferences
that are separable between consumption and hours worked. The response of consumption
to the uninsurable component of wages is equal to the response of earnings. Since log earn-
ings is equal to log wages plus log hours, the pass-through coeﬃcient from the uninsurable
component of wages to earnings is given by 1 + (1 ¡ °)=(° + ¾) = (1 + ¾)=(° + ¾).
17As under the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation, individual consumption and leisure also depend
on the variance of the insurable component of the log wage, v": For any individual state (®;");
both consumption and leisure are increasing in v":
5.2 Welfare analysis with separable preferences
We now state a pair of propositions analogous to Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1a: With separable preferences the (approximate) welfare eﬀect from a
change in labor market risk (∆v";∆v®) is:












































Proof: See Appendix D.
Corollary 1a: With separable preferences, the (approximate) welfare gains from com-
pleting markets and from eliminating risk in an economy with variances (v®;v") are given,
respectively, by:
































Welfare eﬀect from rising labor market risk (!): As with Cobb-Douglas prefer-
ences, increasing insurable productivity dispersion strictly increases welfare in proportion
to the Frisch elasticity. Once again, the intuition is simply that an unconstrained planner
can achieve better allocative eﬃciency with larger dispersion by having the more productive
agents specialize in market work. An interesting diﬀerence between the two preference speci-
ﬁcations is that when preferences are separable, the productivity gain associated with greater
wage dispersion translates into higher average consumption, whereas in the Cobb-Douglas
18case productivity gains have no impact on average consumption, but translate into higher
welfare through an increase in average leisure.16
The welfare eﬀects of a rise in uninsurable uncertainty are more complex. When ° > 1;
the income eﬀect from a positive wage shock dominates the substitution eﬀect, so agents
increase work eﬀort in bad times. In this case, ﬂexible labor supply is used to improve
consumption smoothing at the expense of productivity (the level eﬀect is negative). When
° < 1; the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect, and agents increase work eﬀort
in good times. In this case, ﬂexible labor supply actually increases consumption volatility,
but it is still beneﬁcial because agents are relatively unconcerned about ﬂuctuations in con-
sumption, and concentrating work eﬀort in high wage periods raises average output per hour
(the level eﬀect is positive). In light of our discussion, we conclude that for ﬂexible labor
supply to mitigate the welfare cost of increases in uninsurable wage risk, it must be the case
that ° 6= 1; implying that preferences are inconsistent with balanced growth.
For ° ¸ 1; the expression for ! indicates that additional uninsurable risk is unambigu-
ously welfare-reducing. However, a surprising ﬁnding is that when ° < 1=(2 + ¾), a rise
in v® has a positive welfare eﬀect.17 The intuition is that when risk aversion is suﬃciently
small and the labor supply elasticity suﬃciently large, agents willingly substitute labor sup-
ply intertemporally to raise average productivity, and are relatively unconcerned about the
resulting ﬂuctuations in consumption. Two interesting benchmarks are ° = 0; in which case
! = (1=2)(1=¾)(∆v® + ∆v"); and ° = ¾ = 1; in which case ! = (1=2)(¡∆v® + ∆v")
Panel (A) of Figure 2 provides a graphical summary of how the overall cost of rising
dispersion, !; varies with risk aversion, °; and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, ¾:
Welfare gains from completing markets (Â): As in the Cobb-Douglas case, there
are two sources of welfare gains from insuring risk. The ﬁrst is the gain from the additional
insurance provided by increased risk sharing. The second is the allocative eﬃciency gain
associated with elastic labor supply: under complete markets, more productive households
work relatively longer hours and less productive households enjoy more leisure.
The welfare gain from completing markets is strictly increasing in °, the degree of risk-
16This can be easily seen by computing E[c(®;")] and E[1 ¡ h(®;")] under both preference speciﬁcations.
See Appendix B for the Cobb-Douglas case, and Appendix D for the separable case.
17Recall that in the Cobb-Douglas case, increases in uninsurable wage dispersion v® always reducing
welfare.
19aversion. A few benchmarks are of interest. First, for ° = 0 (risk-neutrality), the welfare
gain is exactly zero, since consumption ﬂuctuations are not costly. Second, in the absence of
ﬂexible labor supply (¾ ! 1), the welfare gain is Â ' °v®=2, the Lucas expression for the
welfare cost of consumption ﬂuctuations. Third, if ° = ¾ = 1, then Â ' v®.
Panel (B) of Figure 2 documents that Â is non-monotone in ¾. For ¾ < 1, Â is always
increasing in the Frisch elasticity. However, for ¾ ¸ 1; whether or not Â is increasing in
the Frisch elasticity depends on whether ° · 2¾=(¾ ¡ 1). The intuition is that, given
high aversion to consumption ﬂuctuations, an increase in the willingness to substitute hours
intertemporally can have a larger positive impact on welfare under autarky (by eﬀectively
improving self-insurance) than under complete markets (by increasing average productivity).
Welfare eﬀect from eliminating risk (·): As in the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation,
eliminating labor market risk amounts to reducing to zero the variances of both components
of the wage process, which is welfare reducing for insurable risk, and likely welfare-improving
for uninsurable risks. Comparing panels (B) and (C) of Figure 2 it is clear that the welfare
gains from eliminating risk are similar to those from completing markets when the Frisch
elasticity is low (¾ is high), but are much smaller - and in some cases negative - when the
Frisch elasticity is high.
6 Observables-based welfare analysis
It is possible to derive alternative representations for the welfare eﬀects of rising inequality
(and for the level and volatility components) as functions only of preference parameters and
second moments of the joint cross-sectional distribution for wages, hours and consumption.
The key advantage of these observables-based expressions, relative to the parametric
expressions described above, is that they are more general. They can be applied to any
economy in which (i) the standard intratemporal optimality condition between consump-
tion and leisure/hours worked is satisﬁed, and (ii) wages, consumption and leisure/hours are
jointly log-normal. Moreover, in order implement the observables-based approach, we do
not need estimates for how the variances of uninsurable versus insurable wages risks have
changed over time, (∆v®,∆v"):18 Thus we can estimate welfare eﬀects simply by computing
18Within the context of our particular model economy, information about these parameters is eﬀectively
embedded in the evolution of equilibrium cross-sectional moments.
20the relevant moments in repeated cross-sections and assigning values to preference param-
eters. However, the observables-based approach requires high-quality data on consumption
and hours, while the model-based approach only requires panel data on wages. We therefore
view the two alternative approaches as complementary.
The following assumptions are convenient.
Assumption A1: Preferences are Cobb-Douglas and wages w, consumption c, and
leisure 1 ¡ h are log-normally distributed in the cross-section.
Assumption A1’: Preferences are separable and wages w, consumption c, and hours
worked h are log-normally distributed in the cross-section.
Assumption A2: Wages and allocations satisfy individual intratemporal optimality, ag-
gregate consumption equals aggregate labor income, and the average wage equals one (so
E[logw] = ¡var(logw)=2).
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Proposition 2: Under Assumptions A1-A2 and A1’-A2 the (approximate) welfare eﬀect
! of a rise in wage dispersion can be expressed as:
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Moreover, the level eﬀect !lev (approximately) equals the percentage change in aggregate labor
productivity ∆log(C=H).
Proof: See Appendix E.
21The expression for ! in Proposition 2 comprises four terms. The ﬁrst term is the change
in the covariance between hours and wages: a higher positive correlation between individual
hours and individual productivities improves the level of aggregate welfare. This change in
the covariance is equal to the level eﬀect !lev as deﬁned in (5), and can also be shown to
equal the change in aggregate labor productivity in the economy.
The second and third terms capture the volatility cost of a rise in wage dispersion: an
increase in the variance of log consumption translates into a welfare cost proportional to the
risk-aversion coeﬃcient, and an increase in the variance of log hours translates into a welfare
cost that is proportional to the coeﬃcient uHHH=uH, which measures aversion to hours
ﬂuctuations. In the separable case, this term is exactly the inverse of the Frisch elasticity,
¾. In the Cobb-Douglas case, when ´ = 1=2 (consumption and leisure receive equal weight
in utility), it is equal to the risk-aversion coeﬃcient ¯ °.
The fourth term, involving the change in the covariance between consumption and hours
worked, is only present when utility is non-separable in consumption and leisure. It is zero
in the separable case and when the Cobb-Douglas utility function becomes “log-log”, i.e.,
for µ = 1. In the Cobb-Douglas case, when µ > 1 (which implies ¯ ° > 1), consumption and
leisure (hours worked) are substitutes (complements); thus households gain from a rise in
the comovement between consumption and hours worked.
Clearly, our model economy satisﬁes Assumptions A1-A2. Indeed, one can easily use
our closed-form equilibrium allocations to compute analytical expressions for cross-sectional
moments as a function of preference parameters and variances of uninsurable and insurable
shocks (v®;v"). Substituting these expressions into the welfare representation of Proposition
2, and rearranging terms, yields the model-based welfare eﬀects of Propositions 1 and 1a.
A word on the approximations implicit in Proposition 2 is in order. The derivations in
Appendix E show that we can reach exact observables-based representations for both prefer-
ence speciﬁcations. However, while the one for the separable case is in terms of hours worked,
the one for the Cobb-Douglas case is in terms of leisure. In order to obtain the common
representation for welfare change in Proposition 2, one needs to take an approximation, in
the Cobb-Douglas case, in order to to translate cross-sectional moments involving leisure
into moments involving hours worked.
Assumptions A1 and A1’ can be relaxed. In fact, the observables-based expression for
22the welfare eﬀect in equation in can alternatively be obtained from a second-order Taylor
approximation of any continuously diﬀerentiable concave utility function (where the Taylor
approximation is taken over logc and logh around the average consumption and hours
worked). Log normality of the allocations is required to show that the welfare gain from
changes in aggregate consumption and leisure – the level eﬀect – is approximately equal to
the change in the covariance between log hours and log wages. Details are available upon
request.
7 Quantitative welfare analysis
7.1 Calibration and measurement
First we discuss our baseline choices for preference parameters. Next we discuss the cross-
sectional moments of the joint wage, hours and consumption distribution which we use to
implement our alternative observables-based approach to quantifying the welfare eﬀects of
rising wage dispersion, given the expressions in Proposition 2. Finally, we estimate the
variances of insurable and uninsurable wage risk before (v®;v") and after (b v®;b v") the recent
well-documented surge in wage dispersion (see Katz and Autor, 1999; Eckstein and Nagypal
2004, for empirical surveys). These variances are a key input of our model-based welfare
expressions of Propositions 1 and 1a.
Preference parameters: We begin with the separable case. Estimates for the risk-
aversion coeﬃcient ° (or, identically, for the inverse of the intertemporal labor supply elastic-
ity) between one and three are typical in the empirical consumption literature (see Attanasio,
1999, for a survey), so we set ° = 2. Domeij and Flod´ en (2006) sample the empirical lit-
erature on male labor supply and conclude that the typical estimates of Frisch elasticities
for male labor supply range between 0:1 and 0:3. However, they argue that these estimates
are downward-biased because the standard estimation methods ignore the possibility that
borrowing constraints may bind. By simulation, they show that the unbiased estimates can
be up to twice as large. Moreover, estimates of this elasticity for females are, in general, 3-4
times as large as those for men (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, Table 2). We therefore
set the Frisch elasticity to 0:5, corresponding to ¾ = 2.
23With Cobb-Douglas utility, the Frisch labor supply elasticity and the coeﬃcient of risk-
aversion are not independent since they are both functions of the pair of parameters (µ;´), as
discussed in Section 4.2. Moreover, the parameter ´ has a natural counterpart in the fraction
of the time endowment devoted to work activities. Following the macroeconomic literature
on business cycles, we set ´ = 1=3 (see e.g. Cooley, 1995).19 We then set µ = 4 so the
implied coeﬃcient of risk-aversion ¯ ° equals two, as in the separable case. As a by-product,
we obtain a Frisch elasticity ¯ Á equal to one – a higher number than in the separable case.20
We recognize that there is disagreement regarding appropriate values for preference pa-
rameters, and that some may object to our particular choices. One advantage of our closed-
form expressions for welfare is that one can easily plug in alternative values. We present
results for a large set of alternative parameterizations in Figures 1 and 2:
Measurement of wage, hours and consumption dispersion: From the 1968-1997
waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we select a sample of roughly 2,400
observations/year including every head of household aged between 20 and 59 with positive
earnings (not top-coded and not below half of the current minimum wage), and with annual
hours worked between 520 and 5824.21 We compute hourly wages as annual pre-tax earnings
divided by annual hours worked, and we regress both wages and hours on race dummies and
a quartic in age in order to ﬁlter out predictable life-cycle variation.22 We construct variances
and covariances on the (log) residuals of these regressions. We ﬁnd that the variance of log
wages rose by 0:10 (from 0.25 to 0.35) over this time period, the variance of log-hours worked
rose by 0:01 (from 0.082 to 0.092), and the covariance between hours and wages rose by 0:017
(from -0.023 to -0.006).
For consumption dispersion, we rely on existing studies based on the Consumer Expen-
19More precisely, the ﬁrst-order condition for hours worked in a non-stochastic version of the model implies
h = ´:
20We chose to equate the coeﬃcient of risk aversion across alternative preference speciﬁcations, rather than
the Frisch elasticity for labor supply, because the lower bound on the Frisch elasticity under the Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation is Á = 1 ¡ ´ = 2=3.
21This latter restriction serves the purpose of reducing the extent to which measurement error in hours,
which is well known to be pervasive, can aﬀect our statistics. In general, the levels of variances and covariances
are potentially aﬀected by measurement error. However, as long as the measurement error 1) is multiplicative
in levels, 2) is orthogonal to the true value, and 3) exhibits constant variance over the period, then the changes
in these measured cross-sectional moments, which are the inputs to our cross-sectional calculations, will not
be aﬀected.
22This ﬁrst-stage regression ensures consistency with the consumption data, since Krueger and Perri (2006)
report cross-sectional variances for log consumption using residuals from a similar regression.
24diture Survey (CEX). For consistency with individual wage and hours data, we focus on
consumption data expressed in adult-equivalent units. According to Slesnick (2001), the rise
in the variance of log-consumption between 1980 and 1995 was small, around 0.01 (0.20 in
1980, 0.21 in 1995). Krueger and Perri (2006) and Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura (2004)
argue that consumption inequality rose by about 0.05 over the same period. Since there are
important measurement issues that are not yet settled in this literature, we simply adopt a
mid-point estimate of 0.03 for our calculations. Finally, Krueger and Perri (2003) report that
the covariance between hours and consumption declined by 0.007 (from 0.037 to 0.030).23
Measurement of insurable/uninsurable wage components: We estimate a simple
permanent/transitory model for the variance of log wages, exactly the process speciﬁed in
the description of the model economy. The estimated variance of the transitory/insurable
component v" starts around 0.08 in the late 1960s and levels oﬀ thirty years later at around
0.13. The variance of the permanent/uninsurable component v® starts at a value around 0.17
and rises to 0.22 in the mid 1990s. In light of these results, we set ∆v" = ∆v® = 0:05 when
evaluating the welfare implications of rising dispersion. Moreover, focusing on the levels of
labor market uncertainty for the 1990s, we set v® = 0:22 and v" = 0:13.24
An alternative approach to estimating (∆v";∆v®) would involve using expressions for the
variances and covariances of wages, hours and consumption, which can be derived in closed-
form given the equilibrium decision rules in Sections 4 and 5. The idea is that observed
changes in second moments involving endogenous variables are informative about changes
in the variances of underlying insurable and uninsurable shocks. We pursue this strategy in
a companion paper (Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante, 2007b) and ﬁnd that it delivers a
similar breakdown of increased cross-sectional wage dispersion into insurable and uninsurable
components.
23Note that our PSID sample has an earlier start date than the CEX, which is only available on a consistent
basis since 1980. Fortunately, almost all of the observed rise in wage inequality occurred after this date.
24Our ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: (i) the transitory component accounts for roughly 1/3 of the
total dispersion; (ii) the rise in wage dispersion is accounted equally by the two components. These results
are broadly in line with the ﬁndings by Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994).
25Table 1: Welfare Eﬀects (% of lifetime consumption)
Welfare eﬀect of Welfare gain from Welfare eﬀect from
rise in wage dispersion completing markets eliminating risk
model-based observables-based
Cobb-Douglas Preferences
! ! Â ·
-2.47% (-2.50%) -2.75% +39.1% (+33.0%) +16.9% (+15.5%)
Volat. Level Volat. Level Volat. Level Volat. Level
-7.50% +5.00% -4.45% +1.70% +11.0% +22.0% +28.5% -13.0%
Separable Preferences
! ! Â ·
-3.06% (-3.13%) -2.30% +29.2% (+24.8%) +17.8% (+16.0%)
Volat. Level Volat. Level Volat. Level Volat. Level
-4.38% +1.25% -4.00% +1.70% +8.3% +16.5% +17.0% -1.0%
7.2 Results
We summarize our results in Table 1. To gauge the quality of our approximations relative to
the exact welfare expressions contained in the Appendix, we also report, in parentheses, the
values implied by the approximated welfare expressions described in Propositions 1 and 1a.
Below the total welfare changes, we report the decomposition of our approximated welfare
eﬀects into level and volatility components.
Welfare eﬀects of rising dispersion, model-based approach: The welfare losses
associated with the observed rise in wage dispersion are quite similar across the two pref-
erences speciﬁcations, between 2:5% and 3% of lifetime consumption. With Cobb-Douglas
preferences, the welfare loss due to the volatility component is 7:5% of lifetime consumption,
while the partially oﬀsetting welfare gain due to improved aggregate labor productivity is
5%: With separable preferences both components are smaller in absolute value. One reason
is that the Frisch elasticity is lower under the separable speciﬁcation, which implies that
additional insurable risk translates into a smaller increase in hours dispersion, and a smaller
increase in aggregate productivity.25
25In addition, the fact that ° > 1 means that additional uninsurable risk reduces average labor productivity
26Welfare eﬀects of rising dispersion, observables-based approach: For the sep-
arable preferences case (assuming ° = ¾ = 2), one can easily plug in the observed changes
in the variances of hours, consumption, and in the covariance between hours and wages to
obtain ! = ¡2:3%. A similar computation for the Cobb-Douglas case (for which we also
need the change in the covariance between hours and consumption) yields ! = ¡2:75%.
These estimates are very close to those from the model-based approach, which is encour-
aging given that the two sets of calculations rely on very diﬀerent inputs. The reason for the
broad correspondence between the two sets of welfare numbers is that viewed through the
lens of our model, the observed changes over time in empirical cross-sectional variances and
covariances for wages, hours and consumption point to values for (∆v";∆v®) that are very
close to the ones we used as inputs to the model-based welfare calculations, i.e., (0:05;0:05).
Krueger and Perri (2003) propose evaluating welfare eﬀects using individual consump-
tion data. Using the panel-dimension of CEX, they estimate Markov transition matrices
for consumption and hours worked in two sub-samples (before and after the rise in wage
inequality) and use these stochastic processes directly into preferences to compute welfare
eﬀects. However, in constructing their data, they abstract from the level eﬀect by demean-
ing all observations, so their calculations should be compared to our volatility eﬀect. They
assume Cobb-Douglas preferences and set ¯ Á = ¯ ° = 1:33. Given the observed changes in
cov (logh;logw); var(logc) and var(logh), this parameterization maps into a volatility
eﬀect of !vol = ¡2:5%, which is quite close to their estimated welfare loss of ¡2:1%.26
From Proposition 2 it follows that the degree to which a society is able to allocate labor
eﬃciently – labor productivity – has the simple empirical representation cov (logh;logw),
irrespective of preferences. In our PSID sample, labor productivity, measured as the ratio
of aggregate earnings to aggregate hours, increased by 13% from 1975 to 1995. Thus, the
increase in the wage-hours covariance (1:7%) can alone account for more than a tenth of the
increase in aggregate labor productivity over this period.
Welfare gains from completing markets: With Cobb-Douglas preferences, a house-
hold in the partial-insurance economy values the availability of a complete set of insurance
when preferences are separable, partially oﬀsetting the positive eﬀect of additional insurable risk, since strong
wealth eﬀects induce permanently more productive agents to increase leisure.
26We obtain this number as follows. They report that when using consumption data only, welfare losses are
of the order of ¡1:6%. Incorporating leisure into their analysis subtracts another 0:5% from their benchmark
estimate.
27markets against the permanent component of wages at 39% of her lifetime consumption.
With separable preferences, this estimate is smaller, around 29%. The striking feature of
these results is that, in both cases, the gains associated with better productive opportunities
in complete markets are twice as big as the gains from reduced dispersion. Recall that in the
separable case, since ° > 1, households with low permanent (uninsurable) wage components
work longer hours than those with high permanent components. However, eﬃciency dictates
a positive correlation between wages and hours. Our calculations indicate that the aggregate
productivity loss due to this ineﬃcient assignment is huge, accounting for two thirds of the
welfare cost of market incompleteness.
Attanasio and Davis (1996, Table 6) calculated the gains from insuring all consumption
risk between age/educational groups to be around 2:67% for a risk aversion value of 2. This
number is an order of magnitude lower than ours for two reasons. First, the data show a large
amount of consumption dispersion even within groups that we capture in our calculations.
Second, by abstracting from labor supply, they miss what we ﬁnd to be the largest source
of welfare gains from completing markets.
Welfare gains from eliminating risk: It is instructive to compare quantitatively the
welfare gains from eliminating labor market risk to those from insuring risk. In the Cobb-
Douglas case we obtain · = 16:9%; compared to Â = 39:1%. Thus, eliminating risk implies
a welfare gain less than half as large as the welfare gain from completing markets. The
corresponding numbers for the separable preferences case are · = 17:8% and Â = 29:2%.
The fact that eliminating the insurable component of wage risk is welfare-reducing leaves
open the theoretical possibility that the welfare eﬀect from eliminating all idiosyncratic wage
risk through some redistributive policy might be negative. In our calibration to the United
States, however, most wage dispersion is uninsurable in nature, and given plausible choices
for preference parameters, the welfare gains from eliminating uninsurable risk exceed the
costs of eliminating insurable risk.
7.3 Relation to numerically-solved Bewley models
How do the results from our analytical model compare to standard incomplete-market models
relying on self insurance through hours worked and borrowing and lending? To provide a
natural and comparable benchmark, we compute the equilibrium of an economy identical
28to our partial-insurance model, except that instead of having access to a complete set of
state-contingent claims providing perfect insurance against transitory wage shocks, agents
trade only a non-contingent bond (e.g., Bewley, 1986; Imrohoroglu, 1989; Huggett, 1993;
Aiyagari, 1994; R´ ıos-Rull, 1994). At the aggregate level, bonds are in zero net supply.
In the Bewley economy, the welfare eﬀect associated with an increase in wage disper-
sion will depend on two additional parameters that could be left unspeciﬁed in the partial-
insurance model: the borrowing limit, and the discount factor ¯:27 The borrowing constraint
is set to the “natural” limit (see, for example, Aiyagari, 1994) which ensures that interest
payments never exceed earnings, given maximum labor eﬀort. Preferences are Cobb-Douglas
and the discount factor is ¯ = 0:97; which implies a ﬁnal steady state interest rate of 3:05%.
The expected welfare eﬀects are computed for individuals born with zero wealth who draw
lifetime wage proﬁles at random from the unconditional wage distribution.
The expected welfare eﬀect in the Bewley economy associated with the measured rise in
wage dispersion is a 2:77% loss. This number should be compared to the 2:37% loss in our
partial-insurance economy.28 Increases in wage risk are slightly more costly in the model
with a single bond, because with a positive interest rate a transitory wage shock has some
eﬀect on lifetime income. Nevertheless, the two models deliver surprisingly similar answers
to our main welfare question.
For comparisons with other papers, consider e.g. Pijoan-Mas (2005). He calculates
the welfare gain from completing markets to be about 16% of lifetime consumption in an
inﬁnitely-lived-agent, production economy with separable preferences and ﬂexible labor sup-
ply. Since ﬁxed eﬀects implicitly remain uninsured under his interpretation of what it means
for markets to be complete, this number should be compared to the welfare gain of moving
from autarky to an environment where the transitory component of wages is fully insured,
while the permanent component remains uninsured (i.e. the partial-insurance economy).
This is given by ! (¡v";v"). Setting ° = 0:98 and ¾ = 0:61 (the parametrization used by
27Levine and Zame (2002) study an endowment economy with inﬁnitely-lived agents, CRRA preferences,
and a non-contingent bond as the only traded asset. They show that as the discount rate goes to zero, agents
achieve arbitrarily good insurance against non-permanent shocks.
28To solve this model numerically, both the permanent component of the wage ® and the transitory
component " are drawn from symmetric two-point distributions. Given this two-point distribution, the
welfare eﬀect from increased wage dispersion in our benchmark partial-insurance economy is ¡2:37% as
compared to the ¡2:47% loss reported in Table 1 for the continuous Normal distribution. More details on
the numerical implementation are available upon request.
29Pijoan-Mas) gives 18:6%.
We conclude that our simple and transparent framework can shed light on the economics
underlying numerical ﬁndings in richer models in the Bewley tradition.
However, our framework cannot be expected to match the quantitative welfare eﬀects
when additional channels of opportunities and insurance are introduced, over and above
savings and hours worked. For example, in Heathcote et al. (2007a), we explore two addi-
tional choices that allow households to increase average labor productivity and mitigate the
welfare loss in response to changes in the wage structure: the ﬂexibility to adjust enrollment
decisions in response to a widening college premium, and the ﬂexibility to reallocate market
work within the household in response to a narrowing gender wage gap.
8 Concluding remarks
The main contributions of the paper are (1) the analytical characterization of the welfare
eﬀects from an increase in the dispersion of labor productivity, and (2) the focus on the
role of endogenous labor supply. In addition, welfare eﬀects are shown to have a common
representation in terms of observable second moments (variances and covariances) of the
joint equilibrium distribution of wages, hours worked and consumption. This is true for
both Cobb-Douglas and separable preferences,
Our analytical insights, together with a simple calibration exercise, show that eliminating
idiosyncratic wage risk implies a welfare gain that is at least two orders of magnitude larger
than most estimates of the welfare gains from eliminating business cycle risk. Thus, according
to our model, the potential gain for a society from applying progressive taxes and wage
compression is much larger than the potential gain from obtaining aggregate stabilization.
However, we also emphasized that the welfare gains from eliminating wage risk (through
policies that compress after-tax wages) are only around half as large as the gains that would
accrue from perfectly insuring wage risk. From a policy perspective, an important implica-
tion is that the government should develop the legal and institutional frameworks that will
allow new insurance markets to develop. Sargent (2001) and Shiller (2003) discuss a range
of proposals along these lines.29
29For example, Shiller proposed six types of insurance that should be further developed, namely “livelihood
30Throughout the analysis, income shocks have been assumed to be veriﬁable and contracts
have been assumed to be perfectly enforceable. Informational asymmetries and imperfect
commitment may limit the amount of insurance that one could ever hope to see provided.
In this sense, our estimates of the welfare costs of market incompleteness are upper bounds.
At the same time, to the extent that risk sharing is limited by fundamental frictions, these
frictions can interact with changes in labor market risk in interesting ways. For example,
Krueger and Perri (2006) study a calibrated endowment economy in which debt contracts
can only be imperfectly enforced. They show that a rise in income dispersion might increase
welfare by making default more painful, thereby increasing the amount of credit that can
be supported in equilibrium. The implications of increased labor market risk in a private
information environment have not yet been addressed. More broadly, an important challenge
in introducing these sorts of frictions is to do this in a way that maintains tractability, thereby
allowing for a transparent characterization of the various mechanisms at work.
Finally, the trade-oﬀ between insurance and opportunities emphasized in relation to the
labor supply decision could also apply to other margins of adjustment. For example, the
widening gap between the wages of college and high-school graduates oﬀers opportunities to
increase average earnings if agents can respond by extending their education. As discussed
above, Heathcote et al. (2007a) incorporates an explicit education choice, and explore how in-
troducing this margin of adjustment (as well as explicit labor supply decisions in two-member
households) mediates the eﬀect of changes in the wage structure on labor productivity and
welfare.
insurance”, “home equity insurance”, “macro markets”, “income-linked loans”, “inequality insurance” and
“intergenerational social security”.
319 Appendix
Appendix A: Derivation of Equilibrium Allocations (Cobb-Douglas Utility)
We follow the “®¡island representation” of our economy outlined at the end of Section
2. We start by guessing that agents on diﬀerent ®¡islands do not trade with each other.
This allows us to solve for allocations within islands using an island-planner problem. Next,
we verify our guess.
The static equal-weight planner problem for an island indexed by a speciﬁc value of ®






subject to a static resource constraint that reﬂects the absence of inter-island trade and the
lack of a storage technology
Z
E
w(®;")h(®;") ¡ c(®;") dΦv"(") = 0: (14)
With Cobb-Douglas utility, the planner’s ﬁrst-order condition for hours is




Substituting the right-hand side of this latter equation into equation (14) and collecting






w(®;")dΦv"(") = ´ exp(®): (16)
The ﬁrst-order condition for consumption is
¹ = ´c(®;")
´(1¡µ)¡1 (1 ¡ h(®;"))
(1¡´)(1¡µ) ; (17)
where ¹ is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint (14). Using (15) to substitute
























































32where the last step exploits the fact that " is log-normal. Combining this last equation with
(16) yields an expression for ¹. Substituting this expression into (18) to solve for consump-
tion, and then using (15) to solve for hours yields the candidate equilibrium allocations, as
functions of primitive parameters, reported in Section 4.1 in the main text.
The last step of the proof requires verifying the no-trade guess. At the candidate alloca-
tions c(®;") and h(®;"), the agent’s Euler equation






yields an interest rate of R = 1=¯ which supports the equilibrium without trade across
®¡islands, since it is independent of ®:
Finally, we guess and will verify that net savings are zero for every agent. Under this








® + (1 ¡ ¸)"




¡ exp(® + "
0):
The ﬁrst-order condition for the purchase of Arrow securities paying one unit of consumption
in the event that an individual with state (®;") receives shock "0 2 E next period is






which yields p(E) = ¯
R
E dΦv"("), i.e., asset prices are discounted probabilities. It is then












Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Start by computing unconditional expected utility
W = E
"¡

















33where the second equality follows from the intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition (15). Substi-
tuting for the equilibrium expression for c(®;") in (11), expected utility becomes:
W = ·Eexp
µ
´ (1 ¡ µ)® ¡ (1 ¡ ´)(1 ¡ µ)" +




















where · ´ ((1 ¡ ´)=´)
(1¡´)(1¡µ) ´1¡µ=(1 ¡ µ), and where the second equation follows from ®
and " being log-normal. Recall that ! is deﬁned by equation (4). Substituting (19) into (4)
and collecting terms yields an exact expression for !
























Taking logarithms on both sides and using a log-approximation of the type ln(1 + !) ' !
for the left-hand side yields the expression stated in Proposition 1.
We now show how to decompose ! into a level eﬀect and a volatility eﬀect. From equation
(5), the level eﬀect of changing variances from (v®;v") to (ˆ v®; ˆ v") is given by
¡¡










where aggregate consumption and leisure are given by
C = E[c(®;")] = ´;
1 ¡ H = E[1 ¡ h(®;")] = (1 ¡ ´)exp(¸v"):
Since C is invariant to wage dispersion, it follows that
¡
1 + !lev¢´ (1¡H)1¡´ =
³
1 ¡ b H
´1¡´
,
which yields the level eﬀect of Proposition 1. Flod´ en (2001) shows that if u(¢) is such that
u(xc;h) = g (x)u(c;h), then






) ! ' !
lev + !
vol; (21)
up to second-order terms. Since Cobb–Douglas preferences satisfy this homogeneity property,
equation (21) deﬁnes !vol residually, given !lev.
Appendix C: Derivation of Equilibrium Allocations (Separable Utility)
When preferences are separable between consumption and hours, the ﬁrst-order condi-










34Equation (22) implies that all agents on an ®¡island get the same consumption (since













Substituting this expression into equations (22) yields eﬃcient allocations only as a func-
tion of the primitive parameters, as described in Section 5.1 in the main text. We then can
verify the no-trade guess exactly as done for the Cobb-Douglas case.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 1a
As in the proof of the Cobb-Douglas case (Appendix B), we start by computing ex-
pected welfare. When preferences are separable between consumption and hours worked,






















































Since ® and " are normally distributed, the terms inside the expectation signs are log-
















































































35Using this expression for expected lifetime utility together with the deﬁnition of ! in






































This welfare expression is exact, but somewhat involved. However, ! can be very closely
approximated by a much simpler expression. In particular, we use a log-approximation
of the type ln(1 + x) ' x on the left-hand side of the equation, and the approximation

































































where the last expression is the one we report in the text in Proposition 1a.
We now show how to decompose ! into a level eﬀect and a volatility eﬀect. Aggregate
consumption and leisure allocations are given by:
















H = E[h(®;")] = exp
µ













With these expressions in hand, we compute the level aﬀect associated with an increase in
the variances of the two components of the wage from (v®;v") to (b v®;b v") by applying the
deﬁnition in equation (5) to the separable preference speciﬁcation:
¡












36where b C and b H denote average consumption and hours worked in the economy with the more








































































































which is the expression reported in Proposition 1a.
We now compute the volatility component of the welfare eﬀect. The ﬁrst step is to
calculate a certainty equivalent value for consumption c(H), such that the utility associated








Given the separable speciﬁcation for preferences, and equations (23) and (25) for expected
utility and aggregate hours, the expression for certainty equivalent consumption can be







(1 + ¾)(1 ¡ °)
° + ¾
µ





























37Applying the approximation exp(x) ' 1 + x and collecting terms gives
c(H)
1¡° '




































Applying the deﬁnition in equation (6), the cost of uncertainty p is the solution to
u((1 ¡ p)C;H) = u(c(H);H)
which, given separable preferences, implies 1 ¡ p = c(H)=C: Substituting in equations (24)
and (26) gives


































Using the deﬁnition for the cost of volatility in equation (7) gives
1 + !
vol =






































which implies the expression for !vol reported in Proposition 1a.
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 2
Cobb-Douglas utility: From the log-normality of c and 1 ¡ h (Assumption A1), ex-



















(1 ¡ µ)´¹c + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ´)¹l +
(1 ¡ µ)
2 £
´2vc + (1 ¡ ´)





where we have used the notation E[logx] ´ ¹x, var(logx) ´ vx, and cov (logx;logy) ´ vxy
for any variables x and y. The welfare eﬀect ! of changing to a new distribution of allocations





= E[u((1 + !)c;h)]: (28)
38Substituting (27) into (28) we obtain
´ (1 ¡ µ)log(1 + !) + (1 ¡ µ)´¹c + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ´)¹l +
(1 ¡ µ)
2 £
´2vc + (1 ¡ ´)
2 vl + 2´ (1 ¡ ´)vcl
¤
2
= (1 ¡ µ)´ˆ ¹c + (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ´) ˆ ¹l +
(1 ¡ µ)
2 £
´2ˆ vc + (1 ¡ ´)




Rearranging terms, using the fact that log(1 + !) ' ! for ! small, and noting that C ´
E(c) = exp(¹c + vc=2), and 1 ¡ H ´ E(1 ¡ h) = exp(¹l + vl=2) yields
! ' ∆logC +
1 ¡ ´
´
∆log(1 ¡ H) ¡





[1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ´)]∆vl

























By Assumption A2, the individual intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition is satisﬁed:
(1 ¡ ´)c = ´w(1 ¡ h) (30)
Taking expectations of (30), and using W ´ E(w) = 1 by Assumption A1, as well as
E(wh) = C by Assumption A2, yields C = ´ (and therefore, ∆logC = 0). At the same
time, by Assumption A2 and by the log-normality of the allocations, we also have that







= 1 ¡ (1 ¡ H)exp(vwl) (31)
where we have used the fact that W = 1: Setting C = ´,
∆vwl = ¡∆log(1 ¡ H): (32)
Now, note that, for small deviations of h from its mean, we can write
log(1 ¡ h) = log(1 ¡ H) + log
1 ¡ h
1 ¡ H



























where the last approximation uses H ' ´; which is true for vwl small (see equation (31)):
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39Substituting (32) and (33) into equation (29) yields immediately the representation for
! in Proposition 2 for the Cobb-Douglas case.
It remains to show how to decompose ! into a level eﬀect and a volatility eﬀect. The






lev = ∆logC +
1 ¡ ´
´
∆log(1 ¡ H): (34)















where we have used H ' ´, jointly imply that !lev ' ∆log(C=H). As argued in the proof
of Proposition 1, the volatility eﬀect is deﬁned residually.
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(1 ¡ °)¹c + (1 ¡ °) vc
2
¢ : (37)
40The intratemporal ﬁrst-order condition (satisﬁed by Assumption A2), can be expressed
as
logÃ + ¾ logh = logw ¡ ° logc






¡ °¹c ¡ ¾¹h
´
: (38)
Moreover, recall that, from Assumption A2,



























where the approximation holds when cross-sectional dispersion is small.30
Using this result into (36), and exploiting approximations of the type log(1 + x) ' x and







































From (39), we have that C=H = exp(vwh): Taking logs and ﬁrst diﬀerences,
!
lev = ∆logC ¡ ∆logH = ∆vwh:
Substituting this expression into (41) yields the representation of Proposition 2 for separable
utility.
30For example, consider the parameterization of Section 7.1, where ° = ¾ = 2, and the empirical values
for the variances and covariances needed to compute expression (40) are: vh = 0:092, vc = 0:25, vw = 0:35,
and vwh = ¡0:006 (see Table A). This parameterization gives exp
¡
¾ vh
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45Table A: Summary statistics from PSID data
Year Variance of Variance of Covariance 
log-wages log-hours log-wages log-hours
1967 0.25496 0.08064 -0.02473  
1968 0.24756 0.08362 -0.02184
1969 0.25206 0.08225 -0.02417
1970 0.26076 0.09592 -0.02128
1971 0.25906 0.08718 -0.03173
1972 0.26850 0.09268 -0.02474
1973 0.26640 0.08595 -0.02443
1974 0.25705 0.09583 -0.02027
1975 0.26036 0.10521 -0.02227
1976 0.26632 0.09131 -0.02326
1977 0.24934 0.08500 -0.01365
1978 0.26696 0.08103 -0.01856
1979 0.25401 0.08318 -0.01258
1980 0.26865 0.08975 -0.01631
1981 0.27447 0.08906 -0.00852
1982 0.30802 0.10198 -0.00863
1983 0.30302 0.10537 0.00172
1984 0.31745 0.09564 -0.00824
1985 0.34405 0.09292 -0.00573
1986 0.34248 0.09463 -0.00550
1987 0.33425 0.09132 -0.00178
1988 0.33973 0.09331 -0.00476
1989 0.33208 0.08535 -0.00605
1990 0.34373 0.09598 0.00102
1991 0.34268 0.09764 -0.00917
1992 0.36225 0.09871 -0.01445
1993 0.35083 0.10329 -0.01457
1994 0.34625 0.09318 -0.00285
1995 0.34679 0.09238 -0.00511  
1996 0.34430 0.09066 -0.00726
Note: years in bold (1967-1968 and 1995-1996) are those used to 
compute values in initial and final steady-state. See Section 7.1 
for details on the sample selection.






































Inverse of the Frisch elasticity (1/φ)








































Inverse of the Frisch elasticity (1/φ)











































Inverse of the Frisch elasticity (1/φ)
(C) Coefficient of Risk Aversion as a function of 1/φ
χ
κ
Figure 1: Cobb-Douglas Preferences: Panel (A) plots the welfare eﬀect from a change in
wage dispersion as a function of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. Panel (B) plots the
welfare eﬀects from completing the markets and eliminating risk as a function of the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity. Panel (C) plots the coeﬃcient of risk aversion as a function of the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity, assuming ´ = 1=3. Panels (A) and (B) are based on the
estimates for (changes in) v® and v" described in Section 7.1. The black dots represent the
baseline parameterization.





































Inverse of the Frisch elasticity (σ)
(A) Welfare effect from rising labor market risk (ω)
                 (∆ v
α=∆ v
ε=0.05)            







































Inverse of the Frisch elasticity (σ)
(B) Welfare change from completing markets (χ) 
               (v
α=0.22, v
ε=0.13)              





































Inverse of the Frisch elasticity (σ)
(C) Welfare change from eliminating risk (κ) 
             (v
α=0.22, v













Figure 2: Separable Preferences: Panel (A) plots the welfare eﬀect from a change in wage
dispersion as a function of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. Panel (B) plots the welfare gain
from completing markets as a function of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. Panel (C) plots
the welfare change from eliminating risk as a function of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity.
All plots are based on the estimates for (changes in) v® and v" described in Section 7.1. The
black dots represent the baseline parameterization.
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